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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
COLLEGES: Jurisdiction of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare
A private college that does not otherwise receive financial assistance from
the federal government, but whose students receive loans and/or grants from
that government, is not subject to regulation under Title IX of the 1972 Educa-
tion Amendment except with respect to its handling of such loans or grants.
So ruled Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare.'
The majority asserts that in enacting this amendment, Congress did not in-
tend HEW to have pervasive power to regulate the whole college operation
simply because it might benefit institutionally from the proceeds of those loans
and grants. It therefore disagreed with Grove City College v. Bell,2 decided
only a few months previously. Looking at section 901(a) of the amendment,
which specifies that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under, any education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance," and since Hillsdale practiced no sex discrimina-
tion with respect to its administration of loans and grants, the court relied
on North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,3 in which the Supreme Court
adopted the view that Title IX dealt with individual "programs" and not total
institutional operations. The court therefore denied HEW's assertion that the
College must furnish assurance of compliance with Title IX in all areas as
a condition to receiving student loans and grants.
CRIMINAL LA W Competency of Radar Results as Evidence
On two previous occasions, Cantrell v. State' and Thompson v. State,2 the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals declined to resolve the issue of the com-
petency of radar results. In Cantrell the court held that the competency of
the radar results was not at issue because it was not necessary to prove that
the defendant was actually speeding but only that the officer was justified
in pursuing and stopping the defendant. In Thompson, since the defendant
had not objected to the introduction of the radar results at trial but rather
had brought the issue up for the first time on appeal, the court held that
1. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982), one judge dissenting.
2. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
3. 102 S.Ct. 1912 (1982).
1. Cantrell v. State, 561 P.2d 973 (Okla. Cr. App. 1977).
2. Thompson v. State, 453 P.2d 314 (Okla. Cr. App. 1969).
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the defendant had waived any objection he might have. However, in Shears
v. State,3 a case of first impression, the court squarely faced the issue.
Defendant was stopped for speeding after the radar device in the arresting
officer's patrol unit registered his vehicle at a speed of 67 miles per hour.
At trial the officer testified that before stopping defendant he had performed
two accuracy tests of the radar device. One was conducted with a calibrated
tuning fork, the other by way of an internal calibration unit. Both tests in-
dicated that the device was functioning accurately. The officer also testified
that he had received both classroom and field training in the operation of
radar devices. The defendant was convicted, but argued on appeal that the
officer's testimony as to the radar results was incompetent because the testing
devices used to verify the accuracy of the radar unit (tuning fork and internal
unit) had not been proven accurate.
The court noted that a survey of cases that have considered the issue in-
dicated that there are three basic prerequisites to a conviction of speeding
based on radar results:
1. the scientific reliability of the radar speedmeter as a recorder of speed;
2. the accuracy of the particular speedmeter used in a given case;
3. the proper operation of the radar equipment."
As to the first prerequisite, the court stated that judicial notice may be
taken of the scientific reliability of radar.5 Concerning the second prerequisite,
the one at which defendant's argument was directed, the court noted that
both tuning forks and internal calibration devices are acceptable means of
establishing the accuracy of a particular radar unit.' The court observed that
a requirement that the particular testing devices need be proved accurate would
lead to a chain of evidence that might proceed ad infinitum.7 As an officer
need not be an expert in the science or theory underlying the function of
radar devices,' the court believed the third prerequisite satisfied by the evidence
of the officer's training in the operation of radar speedmeters. Upon the basis
of these guidelines, the court found the radar results competent and affirmed
the conviction.
FAMILY LA W: Noncustodial Parent May Discharge Child Support
Obligation in Nonmonetary Form
The Uniform Adoption Act' allows a legitimate child to be adopted without
3. Shears v. State, 648 P.2d 841 (Okla. Cr. App. 1982).
4. Goger, Proof, By Radar or Other Mechanical or Electronic Devices, of Violation of Speed
Regulations,- 47 A.L.R.3d 822 (1973).
5. Everight v. City of Little Rock, 230 Ark. 695, 326 S.W.2d 796 (1959); State v. Graham,
322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
6. State v. Primm, 4 Kan. App. 2d 314, 606 P.2d 112 (1980).
7. State v. Snyder, 184 Neb. 465, 168 N.W.2d 530 (1969).
8. State v. Primm, 4 Kan. App. 2d 314, 606 P.2d 112 (1980).




the consent of a natural father or mother who has willfully failed to con-
tribute to the child's support for a period of one year preceding the filing
of the petition for adoption.2 In In re Adoption of C.M.G.,' the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify what acts on the part of the
natural parent will qualify as support under section 60.6(3) of Title 10 of
the Oklahoma Statutes (1981). In this case, the custodians of the child sought
to adopt the child without the natural mother's consent based on the mother's
alleged failure to provide for the child's support. The natural mother's at-
tempt to admit evidence of her contributions in the form of food, gifts, and
clothing was denied by the trial court based on the court's belief that only
monetary payments could constitute support under section 60.6(3). In a case
of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling and held that a parent may discharge his unadjudicated support duty
by a contribution in any form toward the child's living expenses according
to the parent's ability.
4
Justice Opala's decision made a clear distinction between child support
obligations imposed upon the noncustodial parent by judicial decree, such
as a child support order in a divorce decree, and the duty in law of a natural
parent to provide for a child's "necessaries." The court previously had ruled
that nonmonetary contributions would not constitute support under a judicially
imposed support obligation. However, an unadjudicated support duty was
deemed comparable to the parent's common law liability for "necessaries"'
which could be satisfied by any provision of necessary food, clothing, or shelter
for the child.
In re Adoption of C.M.G. illustrates the court's recognition of the fun-
damental importance of the parent-child relationship and the court's narrow
construction of any statutes that seek to interfere with that relationship. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court had recently raised the level of proof required to
support an order declaring a child eligible for adoption without parental con-
sent from a weight of the evidence standard to a requirement that the proof
be clear and convincing.6 The court had also declared that a support payment
made shortly before an adoption petition was filed was enough to bar an
adoption proceeding under section 60.6(3), even though it was the first such
payment in 21 months and was made for the express purpose of interrupting
the one-year nonsupport period.7 In re Adoption of C.M.G. continues the
clear and convincing evidence standard as well as further evincing the court's
willingness to construe the statute in favor of the natural parents and against
2. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 60.6(3) (1981).
3. 53 OKLA. B.J. 3007 (Dec. 25, 1982).
4. See id. at 3009 n.2, where the court states that "living expenses" include food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care.
5. This common law liability has been codified in 10 OKLA. STAT. § 13 (1981): "If a parent
neglects to provide articles necessary for his child who is under his charge, according to his
circumstances, a third person may in good faith supply such necessaries and recover the reasonable
value thereof from the parent."
6. In re Adoption of Darren Todd H., 637 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1981).
7. Mann v. Garrette, 556 P.2d 1003 (Okla. 1976).
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the parties seeking to adopt the child without the natural parent's consent.
This trend will likely continue as the court tries to safeguard the almost sacred
parent-child relationship from unwarranted interference.' As the court stated:
"Termination of a right so fundamental as that of a parent to his natural
child calls for an application of the 'full panoply of procedural safeguards'."9
By expanding the term "support" to mean contribution in any form, the court
has established yet another safeguard.
INSURANCE: Good-faith Purchaser of a Stolen Automobile Has an
Insurance Interest
In Snethen v. Oklahoma State Union of the Farmers Educational &
Cooperative Union of America,' the Supeme Court of Oklahoma decided an
issue that has split courts throughout the country and that also reverses one
of its earlier decisions.2
In the prior case the court had ruled that a good-faith purchaser of a stolen
automobile did not have an insurable interest that would enable him to recover
under a policy he had taken out on the vehicle. Now, reexamining that decision,
the court overrules that case and finds that under 26 Okla. Stat. § 3605 (1981),
all the statutory criteria for finding an insurable interest are met. In taking
this position, the court refers to the "factual expectation" theory of insurable
interest, viz., that one has an insurable interest "if he stands in some relation
to, or has concern in, the insured property which may be prejudiced by the
happening of the events insured against.., if so circumstanced with respect
to the insured subject-matter as to make him interested in its preservation.'"
Since the good-faith buyer of a stolen vehicle has at least a possessory title
"good against all the world except the true owner"" and has given a valuable
consideration for it, he thus has an "actual, lawful, and substantial economic
interest" that he may legitimately protect.' Thus, with such an interest here,
it cannot be said that the court rested its decision solely on a factual expecta-
tion test. The court states that its new pronouncement shall be given effect
in the instant case, as well as prospectively to insurance losses occurring after
the issuance of its mandate.
8. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has stated that "the rights of a natural parent are to
be regarded with a reverence bordering on sacredness and are not to be judicially revoked on
whim, suspicion, or equivocal or insubstantial evidence." In re Adoption of Goodson, 585 P.2d
1130, 1133 (Okla. App. 1978).
9. 53 OxiA. B.J. 3007, 3008 (Dec. 25, 1982).
1. 54 OxaA. B.J. 441 (1983).
2. Ernie Miller Pontiac v. Home Ins. Co., 534 P.2d I (Okla. 1975).
3. Snethen v. Oklahoma State Union of the Farmer's Educ. & Coop. Union of America,
54 OKLA. B.J. 441, 442 (1983).
4. Id. at 443.
5. Id.
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